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ABSTRACT
Disappointing recent growth rates, the emergence of structurally
unfavorable income and employment conditions, and important institutional
changes in the international trading environment have caused policy
officials in the advanced industrial nations to reconsider the proper mix
of reactive versus active trade policy in easing adjustment to labor market
disruptions and dealing with structural changes. This paper first examines
the implications of traditional trade theory as well as the new theoretical
developments emphasizing imperfect markets for this policy reevaluation.
Alternative policy options are then considered within a framework that
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I. Active Versus Reactive Trade Policy
Trade policy can be used in both an active and reactive manner in
promoting income and employment.1 Reactive trade policy is aimed at miti-
gating the negative income and employment effects of external shock9 on output
and labor markets. The introduction of restrictive import measures in
response to increased imports that cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic producers and workers is an example of using trade policy in this
sense. Providing adjustment assistance to workers or subsidies to producers
under the same set of import circumstances further illustrates the utilization
of trade measures to ease the adverse economic effects of trade—related struc-
tural changes. Still another important type of reactive policy is the imposi-
tion of antidumping or countervailing duties to offset foreign dumping or
subsidization that materially injures domestic producers and workers.
Active trade policy, in contrast, seeks to generate new jobs and higher
income levels by pursuing a positivist approach to changing international eco-
nomic conditions. Encouraging infant industries through import protection or
production subsidies is the classic example of active trade policy. More
generally, the various positive trade measures associated with the term
"industrial policy" fit this classification. Other examples of an activist
approach to trade policies are introducing import duties or export subsidies
to take advantage of international market power and engaging in foreign
dumping.
Controversy over the proper use of trade policy in both its active and
reactive senses is presently as intense as at any time since the beginning2
of the post—World War II international trading regime. This paper examines
the factors giving rise to the controversy and then on the basis of this
analysis considers alternative trade policy options aimed at the goals of
easing the adjustment to labor market disruptions and dealing with structural
changes in a positive manner. An effort is made to consider conceptual
arguments as well as specific policy measures in a framework that recognizes
the real world institutional environment in which international trade takes
place and the actual mariner In which economic agents react to various incen-
tives and penalties.
Like most important economic controversies, the debate over trade
policy has been touched off by a combination of circumstances. Three fac-
tors are especially important: (1) the emergence of structurally unfavor-
able income and employment conditions that do not seem responsive to
traditional free—market policy prescriptions; (2) a general recognition that
major Institutional changes have taken place in the international trading
environment that may call for the use of new policies; and (3) the develop-
ment of new economic analyses in international economics that provide better
insights into the appropriateness of alternative policies.
The following three sections review the evidence and arguments
relating to each of these three factors. Particular attention Is given to
the policy implications of both traditional trade theory and recent analyses
based on more realistic assumptions. The fifth section appraises the effec-
tiveness of alternative trade policies In increasing employment under actual
real world conditions and motivations, whereas the sixth places trade policy
within the foreign policy context in which most trade—related decisions are
made. Drawing upon the discussion of the preceding sections, the final sec—3
tiori then sets forth various policy options based on reactive and activist
approaches to trade policy as well as on international cooperation.
II. SHIFTS IN THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The poor recent record of income growth and employment creation in
OECD countries has been well documented in previous OECD studies and will only
be briefly summarized here.2These studies indicate clearly that the period
since the first oil shock in 1973—74 represents a new, less satisfactory eco-
nomic era for OECD countries. In contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s when
real growth rates for these countries averaged 5 per cent annually and the
average unemployment rate was only 2.8 per cent, the period since 1974 has been
characterized by a significant slackening in growth and a sharp rise In
unemployment. Specifically, from 1974 through 1982 real GNP grew at an
average annual rate of only 2 per cent, while unemployment averaged 6.6 per
cent. Closely related to these declines was a fall in the real growth rate of
world trade from 8.5 per cent from 1963—73 to 3.5 per cent from 1973—81. In
addition, consumer prices rose at an average annual rate of over 10 per cent
from 1973 to 1982 in contrast to less than 4 per cent between 1960 and 1973.
A particularly disturbing feature of the slowdown in economic activity is
its uneven geographic, industry and demographic impact. For example, in unlike
the United States where employment growth recovered quickly after the first
oil shock, employment in Europe has remained flat over the last several years.
Similarly, while growth in such sectors as telecommunication equipment, com-
puters, and certain chemicals has been strong, employment has declined in
most OECD countries in textiles, the basic iron and steel industries, and
shipbuilding and repairing. Young people and women have also borne a dis—4
proportionate share of the unemployment. Thus, there is abundant evidence
indicating that the problem is not simply a macroeconomic one. There are
serious structural elements in the unfavorable economic performance of OECD
countries.
The shocks that have played a major role in creating these economic
problems have come from many sources: the introduction of new technology,
shifts in demand, changes in energy conditions, labor supply developments
such as the increase in the proportion of women entering the labor market,
new government economic and socIal policies, shifts in the structure of
international trade, etc. It is this last disturbance source that is of
special relevance for the theme of this session, since trade policies are
usually introduced to deal with economic problems allegedly arising from the
international sector.
Among the significant changes in the pattern of international trade
that OECD countries have had to cope with in recent years is the emergence
of the developing countries as important industrial competitors. As the
1979 report by the Secretary—General, The Impact of the Newly Industrializing
Countries on Production and Trade in Manufactures, pointed out, the 1970s
were characterized by a marked acceleration in the share of newly industra—
lizing countries' (NICs) share of OECD imports of manufactures. This share
rose from 1.6 per cent in 1963 to 8.1 per cent by 1977. As would be expected
on the basis of trade theory, the export increases from the NICs have been
concentrated in industries based on mature technologies and utilizing high
proportions of relatively unskilled labor. They include textiles, clothing,
leather and footwear, woodworking, certain types of electrical machinery,5
rubber manufactures, some manufactures of metal, and miscellaneous finished
manufactures.
A number of these industries were already faced with unemployment problems
in OECD countries due to such factors as import increases from other developed
countries, sluggish demand growth, and the introduction of labor—saving
technology. Consequently, there has been much concern about the additional
unfavorable employment impact associated with the rapid rise in the NIC's
market share in these product lines. As Professors Sapir and Schumacher report
in their paper,3 Schumacher has estimated that some 600,000 jobs (40 percent
of which were in the textile, clothing and leather sectors) were lost in the
EEC between 1970 and 1977 as a result of increased imports of manufactures.
This equals .6 percent of total manufacturing employment in 1977.
The other side of the picture is that industrial exports from OECD members
to the developing countries have also grown rapidly and that OECD countries
have a substantial trade surplus in these products with the developing
countries. The exports have consisted essentially of investment goods.
Thus, as a consequence of these relationships, Schumacher estimates that
between 1970 and 1977 1.8 million new jobs were created through OECD exports
to developing countries. In other words, while the growing importance of
these nations as industrial trades has created significant adjustment
problems for certain labor—intensive sectors, on balance this development
has been an important net contributor to employment.
Another important shift in international competitiveness that has stim-
ulated debate over the proper use of trade policy is the sharp rise since
1973 in the deficit of most OECD countries with Japan. For example, the
U.S. and EEC trade deficits with Japan rose from $2.2 and $1.6 billion,6
respectively, in 1973 to $18.3 and $12.5 billion, respectively, in 1981.
However, this rise in net Japanese exports of manufactured goods to other
industrial countries has been largely offset by a net increase in primary—
product imports from the developing nations and certain developed countries.
Nevertheless, the rapid growth in Japanese exports of motor vehicles and
other transport equipment, machinery, iron and steel, and household
appliances has exerted considerable adjustment pressure on labor and manage-
ment in most OECD countries and has led both to the adoption of numerous
trade—restricting measures and the call for further export—promoting
activities.
As Sapir and Schumacher document in their paper, broad shifts in the
composition of the trade of OECD countries have been another source of
structural adjustment pressures in these countries. One of the most impor-
tant of these shifts is the more rapid growth in services trade than in com-
modity trade. Although the statistics on the extent of services trade are
imperfect, these authors estimate than trade in services is growing about 00
faster than trade in goods. One consequence is a shift in the demand for
occupational skills. Services require relatively high proportions of pro-
fessionals and managers as well as sales and clerical workers, whereas manu-
factured goods use comparatively large numbers of operatives and craftmen.
However, the labor coefficient for services that enter international trade
is only slightly lower than for manufactured commodities and the average
educational requirements are only moderately higher in the traded services
sector.
Shifts in the composition of trade in manufactured goods have also led
to structural adjustment pressures in OECD countries. As the developing7
countries have gained competitively in labor—intensive manufactures, the
export share of textiles, clothing, and leather has declined while the
import share has risen. Non—electrical machinery has declined slightly in
relative importance on both the export and import side, but this decline has
been more than offset by a market rise of electrical machinery and motor
vehicles. Chemicals have also become relatively more important as a traded
good but more so on the import than export side. Finally, there has been a
sharp fall, especially in imports, in the share of primary metal products.
Obviously, as Schumpeter pointed out long ago,4 economic growth is
never likely to be a smooth process that affects all parts of an economy in
the same way. Instead, as in the past, it is likely to be a discontinuous,
disruptive process that both creates new economic sectors and groups and
destroys old ones. Consequently, the various international and other struc-
tural shocks described above might be considered as simply typical of the
development process. However, what seems unique in the experience of OECD
countries over the last decade or so is the suddenness and Intensity of some
of the shocks coupled with a growing degree of resource inflexibility that
makes it increasingly difficult to adjust to exogenous economic events. Doing
little more than providing income maintenance support in order to give
markets time to adjust in the textbook manner does not seem to be a politi—
cally or economically viable option for many governments. Consequently, as
in other fields, there are more frequent calls in the international area for
the more aggressive use of active and reactive trade policy as a means of
coping better with shocks from the international sector.8
III. CHANCES IN THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING FOR TRADE
Both traditional trade theory and the rules of the major international
organization established for the purpose of maintaining a liberal inter-
national trading regime, namely, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(CATT), are based on a set of institutional assumptions that are very dif-
ferent from actual conditions. Trade theory, for example, has typically
assumed that each industry in each country consists of a large number of
competitive firms producing homogeneous products. Factor markets are also
taken to be competitive with productive factors moving freely among domestic
industries and not at all internationally. Governments are assumed not to
participate in the production process.
The GATT is also based on a simplified view of the institutional frame-
work within which international trade takes place, although its recently
approved set of new non—tariff codesdoes improve the situation to a con-
siderable extent. For example, there are no rules dealing with restrictive
business practices or international investment. State trading enterprises
are recognized, but the article dealing with them is concerned mainly with
trading organizations established for revenue purpose rather than with pro-
ducing organizations owned by the government and pursuing development or
adjustment goals. Until recently, even the practice of government sub-
sidization of privately owned firms received only modest attention in the
GATT and the rules are still very general.
In the last 20 years the institutional framework within which inter-
national trade takes place has changed dramatically from that visualized by9
either the classical trade theorists or the framers of the GATT. Two
changes are particularly important: the greatly increased importance of
multinational corporations in world trade and the increased intervention of
the state in international trade through various forms of subsidization,
nontariff import restrictions, and the ownership of production facilities.
By the middle of the 1970s, multinational corporations (firms that
engage in foreign direct investment) accounted for one—fifth of the world's
output. Their production has been growing for some years at 10—12 per cent
annually, a rate almost twice as high •as world output. Furthermore, the
intrafirm trade of these corporations accounts for 25 per cent of all trade
in manufactures. Since multinationals are characterized by significant
size, considerable product and geographic diversity, and an emphasis on R&D
as well as product differentiation, their rapid growth has produced an
imperfectly competitive international market structure quite different from
the static, purely competitive one envisioned in traditional trade theory.
The ability of multinationals to shift technology, capital, and managerial
skills quickly from one country to another to take advantage of differences
in relative costs has also greatly increased the possibilities for disrup-
tive structural shifts in trading patterns.
The greatly increased role of the government in economic affairs has
brought about another significant change in the institutional nature of the
trading environment. The traditional view confines government interven-
tion in the trade field mainly to tariff protection and the occasional impo-
sition of anti—dumping and countervailing duties. However, in many
countri-es governments are now important, active participants in inter—10
national trade. They play a key role in determining which industries will
expand and which will contract by means of direct and indirect planning, by
supplying low—cost funds for research and investment purposes, by
encouraging particular production patterns among firms within an industry,
by facilitating access to capital markets, by providing various tax and
other production subsidies, etc. Furthermore, more and more governments in
the industrial countries are becoming owners of manufacturing and service—
oriented firms that are important international suppliers.
The implications that many policymakers, who are trying to cope with
sluggish growth and serious structural problems, draw from these two develop-
ments are obvious. Instead of viewing the commodity and geographic patterns
of trade as being based on an allocation of world resources that is consistent
with the basic principles of comparative advantage, they regard a large part
of actual trade as being based on private monopoly power and government aids
that artifically create comparative advantage in particular product lines.
Consequently, when these policy leaders observe industries in their own econo-
mies being disrupted by rapid increases in imports or losing exports in third
markets to heavily subsidized firms in other countries, they find it hard to
accept the advice that they should not adopt an aggressive active or reactive
trade policy stance themselves because somehow the existing state of affairs
corresponds to basic resource endowment patterns. To them, the real trading
world is so far removed from the world of trade theory that to follow tradi-
tional policy prescriptions is to risk being exploited by other countries and
to fall behind in international competitiveness.11
IV.TRADE THEORY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS
The durability of the liberal policy prescriptions derived from tradi-
tionaltrade theory seems to demonstrate the truth of Lord Keynes' obser-
vation that ... theideas of economists and political scientists, both when
they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly
understood.'5 Given the unsatisfactory economic conditions inmany OECD
countries and the wide acceptance of the view that actual institutional con-
ditions diverge significantly from those posited under classical trade
theory, one might have expected both this theory and its policy implications
to be widely discredited. However, traditional trade theory and especially
its policy prescriptions continue to be remarkably influential at the
highest government levels in most developed nations as well as within the
international economic organizations that these countries dominate.
There are several possible reasons for this. It may, for example, be
the case that the principles and policies being criticized represent an
overly simplified version of traditional trade analysis and that a complete
statement of the theory is not open to these criticisms. The fact that the
assumptions of traditional trade theory do not closely fit real world con-
ditions also may not be a relevant criticism. Theory often abstracts from
reality in order to bring basic relationships out more clearly. Introducing
all the complexities of reality may not change the essential policy implica-
tions of the theory. Finally, a theory may continue to influence policy
thinking even though everyone is aware of its shortcomings simply because a
satisfactory alternative analysis of the matter under consideration does not
exist. Both scholars and policymakers are reluctant to give up a well—12
established theory that provides clear—cut policy prescriptions in favor of
an incomplete set of alternative relationships whose implications have not
been fully explored in a rigorous manner.
(1) The Policy Implications of Traditional Trade Theory
The basic welfare proposition of traditional trade theory is
simply that some trade is better than no trade for any country. In other
words, given the usual assumptions about perfect competition, internal fac-
tor mobility, and the absence of domestic distortions, it can be shown that
a country can raise its real income level by engaging in international trade
rather than by producing all the goods it wishes to consume itself. However,
if one also assumes that the country is "small" in the sense that the size
of its international purchases and sales has no effect on the prices of
traded goods, a much stronger conclusion can be derived. It then follows
that a policy of free trade will maximize the country's real income level.
Being able to demonstrate under the above conditions that free trade
maximizes a nation's real income is not the same ——itshould be emphasized
——asshowing that every group, e.g., labor, actually ends up better off
under free trade than with no trade or some particular level of import pro-
tection. The maximization statement is a short—hand way of saying that
under a general policy of free trade (given fixed terms of trade and the
other assumptions), it is potentially possible to make everyone better off
within the country no matter what the initial distribution of income,
provided there are no costs of identifying who should be compensated and
redistributing income. In moving from (say) a no—trade position to a par-
ticular market—determined 'free trade position, productive factors used13
intensively in the production of exported goods tend to gain (since the
demand for their services tends to rise) while those involved heavily In
import—competing goods tend to lose in real income terms. Thus, since
income—compensating arrangements for trade policy changes do not exist in
most countries (and those that are in operation generally do not completely
offset losses), and redistribution costs could more than exhaust the aggre-
gate gains from free trade, it is necessary to be very cautious in drawing
practical policy statements from the statement about free trade maximizing a
nations real income.
What if buyers and sellers of a country represent a sufficiently large
part of world markets that by acting collectively they can influence inter-
national prices, at least for some commodities? Quite obviously, buyers and
sellers in large industrial countries fit this description, and even in many
developing countries sellers possess some monopoly power in the markets for
their primary product exports. Under these conditions, as trade theorists
have pointed out for over a hundred years, a country can raise its real income
compared to the free trade level by imposing optimal import or exporttaxes.6
Obviously, when sellers or buyers can affect prices, i.e., their terms of
trade, when acting together, they can improve their collective economic posi-
tion at the expense of other countries by exercising this monopolistic or
monopsonistic power. However, this conclusion depends upon the assumption
that trading partners either do not also possess this power or do not engage
in similar actions. When retaliation by other countries can occur, a wide
range of outcomes is possible, depending upon such factors as each country's
relative size, its tastes and cost conditions, and how each nation expects14
others to react to. its trade actions. For example, in a simple two—country
model one outcome is that both countries end up worse off then under free
trade. However, it has also been shown that it is possible for one of the
countries to end up being better off than under free trade. If each country
recognizes its interdependence with the other, still another possible
equilibrium position is free trade, even in the absence of cooperation.
Another key policy implication of standard trade theory is that free trade
maximizes world production and thus world economic efficiency. More specifi-
cally, if it were possible to redistribute income among countries in a
costless, non—distorting manner, it would be possible to make every country
better off than it would be under any particular non—free trade arrangement.
Of course, since governments are primarily interested in the welfare of their
own people, this conclusion does not have much practical relevance, even if
the fact that redistributional efforts are costly is ignored.
Besides the terms—of—trade argument for trade taxes, classical trade
writers set forth another important reason for government intervention in
the international sector, namely, the infant industry case for protection.
This is an argument for temporary protection based on the failure of private
markets to allocate resources efficiently for some reason. The existence of
technological externalities associated, for example, with knowledge acquisi-
tion, imperfect capital markets, imperfect private information, etc., can
justify the introduction of temporary production subsidies or possibly
tariffs. Such intervention can raise a country's real income over time
without lowering that of other countries.15
In the last 20 years the basic idea underlying the infant industry
case, namely, the existence of some divergence between privateand social
cost or valuation such that the private market mechanism does not maximize
real income, has been extended to cover many other reasons for intervention
by the government in international markets. Factor market distortions, pro-
duction externalities, and consumption divergences, whether institutional or
technologically determined, all give rise to reasons for trade policy inter—
ventions by the goverrunent.8 For example, if unemployment prevails because
wages are rigid in a downward direction for some reason, atariff or export
subsidies may increase employment and welfare in a country without reducing
employment and welfare in other countries. However, in all of these cases
where the divergence (or distortion) exists in domestic markets, interven-
tion through trade taxes or subsidies is second—best in the sense that some
combination of taxes and subsidies not just confined to traded goods can
increase welfare even more. But, when differences in the actual costs of
administering such interventionist policies as wage subsidies, production
subsidies, export subsidies, etc. are taken into account, it is possible
that in some cases trade measures are the best interventionist means.
Trade economists have also long recognized that productive factors,
especially capital, move across national borders and that this has inter-
national economic policy implications. For example, many developing
countries have discovered that protecting certain industries leads to an
inflow of foreign investment and thus increases in domestic employment.
There are also good arguments for interfering with the free international
flow of capital. If the foreign supply curve of capital is upward—sloping,
a country can raise its welfare by exploiting this monopsonistic power16
through a tax on foreign capital. Similarly, if a capital—supplying country
is sufficiently large to affect the rate of return on capital abroad, it can
increase its real income by limiting the outflow of capital through taxes or
other means. Again, these conclusions are based upon the assumption that other
countries do not retaliate.
The preceding summary of the main policy implications of traditional trade
theory, as this theory has evolved to the present time, hardly represents a
c.rt-rf fr.r Nrr ii-hp cnr11viir— - -.--——'--'-
portingprotectionism and other government interventions in international
markets. Instead, the analysis indicates that arriving at appropriate national
trade policy decisions is a difficult and complex matter, even at a theoretical
level. Detailed knowledge is required concerning such matters as economic con-
ditions in the sectors seeking government assistance, the economic consequences
not only of alternative trade policies but of alternative domestic measures, the
likely reaction of foreign producers and governments, etc. However, there are
also many instances when the argument for protection or subsidization can be
easily rejected on general analytical grounds. These cases usually do not try
to show in a serious way that a nation's real income can be raised by government
intervention, but instead basically involve the request of a particular group to
benefit at the expense of the nation as a whole.
(ii) New Analytical Developments
As noted earlier, trade theory has been severely criticized for generally
assuming that there are large numbers of suppliers of each product. In fact,
however, competition is often imperfect in the sense that there are only a rela-
tively small number of producers in each country who supply similar but not17
identical products. A major analytical development in recent years has been to
introduce imperfect competition explicitly into trade models and explore its
implications for trade policy.9 As some of the critics of traditional trade
theory had maintained, the result of this analysis has been to qualify further
the national case for free trade.
To see why a tariff may increase real income in a country when it faces
imperfectly competitive market conditions, consider the case where the foreign
supplier of a particular product is a monopolist and there are no producers of
the item domestically. By charging cons*ers in the importing country a price
that maximizes his profits, the monopolist will earn pure profits. A tariff
imposed by the importing country can capture some of these profits. While the
monopolist will respond to the cost increase due to the tariff by reducing
output and raising foreign price under usual demand conditions, the revenue
increase to the tariff—imposing government will more than offset the loss to
its consumers due to the higher price. However, under some demand conditions
an import subsidy will be the appropriate response since price will fall more
than the subsidy.
If a domestic firm also produces the item and the rivalry between the two
producers is resolved as a Cournot duopoly, a tariff (or subsidy) will not only
increase domestic real income but also domestic employment. Furthermore,
these results generalize to situations in which there are not just two firms
(duopoly) in each market but several firms that recognize their interdepen-
dence (oligopoly). However, more theoretical analysis is needed to determine
whether other policies can achieve the same benefits for a country more effi-
ciently.18
As in the terms—of—trade case discussed earlier, it is important to recognize
that other countries are likely to retaliate by introducing tariffs (or
subsidies) themselves. When this occurs, it can be shown that the combined
welfare of the countries involved ends up below the maximum level that is
achievable. However, when transport costs are so high that unrestricted intra—
industry trade is welfare—reducing, this maximum level will involve some posi-
tive level of tariffs.
One interesting application of the new imperfectly competitive framework
for trade theory helps in understanding why governments adopt export—promoting
policies such as export credit subsidies and R&D subsidies. Suppose, for
example, that a domestic and foreign firm compete in a third market. In the
absence of government Intervention they are assumed to be in a Cournot
equilibrium situation in which they share a certain level of pure profits. If
the government of one of the countries provides export subsidies or R&D sub-
sidies to Its domestic firm, this producer may be able to capture a larger
share of the world market and increase Its profits net of the subsidy. Thus,
the country could gain in income and employment terms. The reason for this
outcome is that the government's action is credible to the foreign competitor
and this foreign firm reduces its output in view of the lower costs of its
competitor. If one of the two firms announced It was going to subsidize
itself, such a statement would not be treated as sustainable by the other and
this other firm would not retrench.
As in the case discussed above, retaliation in the form of subsidies by the
foreign government must be expected. This will lead to a noncooperative solu-
tion where both countries engage in subsidization and where the joint welfare of
the producing countries could be increased by cooperative behavior that reduced19
the level of subsidies.
The trade model formulated by the Cambridge Economic Policy Group, a
research group in the Department of Applied Economics at the University of
Cambridge, represents another analytical development that is especially relevant
for the theme of this conference. The policy prescription emerging from this
model is that industrial countries experiencing high unemployment levels should
introduce general import protection as part of an expansionary government
program aImed at increasIng employment)0 The purpose of the Import restric-
tions is not to protect particular industries or to achieve a
Theggar—thy—neighbor" balance—of—trade surplus but rather to prevent a worsening
in the trade deficit as aggregate demand increases.
Unlike the classical trade model, the Cambridge group postulates an
industrial economy in which there is unemployed labor and excess capital capa-
city. Bargaining by trade unions sets wages at a level that maintains the
purchasing power of workers' take—home pay, while management sets the prices of
domestic goods on the basis of a fixed mark—up over normal unit costs.
Consequently, there is no automatic mechanism that tends to produce full
employment and balance—of—payments equilibrium. Indeed, the Cambridge group
contends that international price and quality trends are tending to push most
industrial countries progressively below their full—employment potential.
Given this highly unfavorable structural unemployment situation, the
Cambridge economists advocate expansionary government fiscal and monetary poli-
cies coupled with either uniform tariffs on imports of services and manufactures
(food and raw materials would be excepted) or quantitative import restrictions.
These trade policies are preferred to the conventional policy of currency20
depreciation for two main reasons. With tariffs or quotas a country can take
advantage of its monopsonistic power and improve Its terms of trade by forcing
foreign suppliers to bear part of the tariff, i.e., foreigners lower the price
(in terms of their own currency) of their exports as the demand for these goods
by the tariff—imposing country declines due to the tariff. Devaluation has this
effect on the import side but, in addition, it lowers the foreign currency price
of the devaluating country's exports. Whether the foreign price of the
country's exports falls more or less than the foreign price of its imports
depends upon the demand and supply elasticities of the commodities involved,
but the Cambridge group's econometric model for the United Kingdom indicates
that devaluation, in contrast to a uniform tariff, will worsen the U.K.
trading terms.
The second reason for preferring tariffs over devaluation is that the latter
policy raises export profits and thus redistributes income away from workers.
Both this effect and the terms—of—trade determination cause workers to press for
higher nominal wages to restore their real wage and thus set off strong infla-
tionary pressures that tends to frustrate the effort to expand employment.
However, according to the Cambridge economists, by employing tariffs or quan-
titative restrictions to prevent an increased trade deficit and by returning the
tariff revenue (or its equivalent) to the workers, inflationary pressures will
be much less and the expansionary government policies will be successful in
raising employment significantly.
Critics argue that the Cambridge model reaches Its conclusions about
employment by not giving sufficient weight to certain medium—term and long—run
economic relationships that are likely to hold. For example, a general
increase In protection by one industrial country Is likely to lead to
retafliatory tariff Increases by its trading partners (especially when their21
terms of trade worsen) that offset any favorable terms—of—trade effect.
Furthermore, in contrast to devaluation, the imposition of tariffs tends to
reduce real income because of the distortion in product prices. If the
country's terms of trade do not improve because, for example, foreigners reta— —
hate,this real Income loss to workers will tend to touch off a wage—price
spiral. When exporters raise their prices In response to higher wages and
imported input costs, the resulting decline In their sales and employment
levels tends to offset the employment gains In the import—competing sector due
to the tariff increases.
The inflationary effects of domestic 'fiscal expansion also cannot be
ignored. The rigidities and inflexibilities that account for the structural
unemployment in the first place may cause, first, selective and then general,
cost and price rises that frustrate the entire employment—generating effort.
It may be necessary to deal directly with these rigidities in order to solve
the unemployment problem.
According to its critics, the Cambridge group also does not pay sufficient
attention to the adverse long—run effects of reducing profits by raising
import prices. By reducing the effective rate of return to saving, this may
decrease long—run investment and the rate of employment growth. In other
words, short—run employment gains mayoccurat the cost of greater
unemployment in the future.
(iii) Conclusions from Theory
The trade policy implications of the recent efforts to Incorporate
more fully Imperfect competition and the existence of structural unemployment
into trade models reinforce those previously reached after considering tradi—
tional trade theory ——notin the stereotyped form that it is sometimes pre-
sented but in the way it is currently used by trade economists.22
There are a variety of conditions in which the introduction of
trade—restricting or trade—promoting policies by a government can increase the
country's income and employment level. It is useful to divide these con-
ditions into two groups: those where the reason for this possibility is due
to the nature of international markets and those where the reason is based on
the existence of particular domestic market circumstances. The first category
covers both the case where a country's producers are operating in competitive
domestic and international markets but the government, through trade policy,
can, in effect, get these producers to act collectively in international markets
as a monopolist, and the case where domestic and international markets are
imperfectly competitive and the country's producers, as well as those of other
countries, are behaving accordingly. In both of these situations government
actions that raise income and employment in a country do so at the expense of
income and employment in other countries. It also follows that if all govern-
ments undertake efforts to raise their income and employment levels at the
expense of others, the final noncooperative equilibrium is a position that is
not optimal for the countries collectively. In other words, by cooperative
efforts to lower tariffs from the levels reached in a noncooperative
equilibrium, it is possible to make all the countries better off in income and
employment terms. However, in certain cases this might have to be coupled
with some international redistribution of income.
In the second category of circumstances (where domestic distortions
are the reason why a country can gain by interventionist trade policies), a
country can raise its income and employment level without necessarily reducing
income and employment in other countries. For example, when demonstrating how
a tariff or export subsidy can raise a country's income, the theoretical23
literature on domestic distortions usually assumes that the country faces
fixed terms of trade. This means that other countries do not suffer any
losses because of this trade policy action. However, as noted previously, a
key result of this analysis is that a domestic policy, e.g., a production
subsidy/tax or a factor subsidy/tax, can raise the country's income even more.
In other words, using trade policy to correct a domestic distortion is a
second—best solution.
For most OECD countries a significant part of their trade takes place in
Imperfect markets and their government can affect their terms of trade. Trade
policies aimed at offsetting a domestic distortion thus can adversely affect
other countries and lead to a retaliating sequence which hurts everyone on
balance. Similarly, cooperative tariff—reducing efforts among countries may
have adverse (or favorable) effects because of the existence of domestic
distortions.
The optimal policy mix from a world welfare viewpoint is to utilize
domestic policies to offset the unfavorable income and employment effects of
domestic distortions and follow a cooperative international approach as far as
trade policy is concerned. But difficult choices still arise for individual
countries and the international community as a whole, even under this policy
mix. For example, while offsetting a domestic distortion with a domestic
policy will increase potential world income more than if an international
measure is used, the trading terms of other countries may decline because of
these domestic policies and they may (and are entitled to under GATT rules)
initiate a retaliatory sequence that hurts all countries. Similarly, what if
it is not feasible politically for a country to offset a domestic distortion
with a domestic policy measure? Others are very likely to retaliate against
this second—best policy, even though potential world income might still be24
increased. What if an international transfer of income to a country is
necessary for it to be worthwhile for this country to engage in a multilateral
tariff—reducing exercise that raises collective income and employment?
Compensatory international income transfers are rare and usually politically
infeasible.
IV. The Ineffectiveness of Trade Policies
Trade theorists have rightly been criticized for making unrealistic
assumptions that lead to very smpl1stc polIcy conclusIons. However, a
similar criticism can be made about analyses of the effectiveness of trade
(or domestic) policies. Discussions of these matters usually take place in an
overly simplified analytical framework based on assumptions that insure that
the policies accomplish their intended purpose. Yet these assumptions are
often unrealistic and lead to incorrect conclusions about the effectiveness of
a particular policy.
This section explores some of the reasons why actual trade policies often
fail to accomplish what the government intends)2 Furthermore, in many cases
It is not economically or politically feasible for governments to take steps
to offset the factors that cause the ineffectiveness of some trade policies.
Trade policies operate directly upon the relative prices and quantities of
imported or exported goods and, by affecting the domestic prices of traded
goods, indirectly influence levels of production, employment, factor rewards,
and consumption in domestic industries producing similar goods. Sometimes the
primary reason for utilizing trade policies is to affect the volume or prices
of traded goods, but more frequently the objective is to influence one of the
variables that is only indirectly affected by trade measures, such as produc-
tion or income.25
There are three general ways in which a trade policy can be ineffective in
attaining its stated purpose. First, domestic prices change in the predicted
direction but not by as much as policy—makers expect because of offsetting
supply and demand responses. Secondly, domestic prices move in the direction
and to the extent desired, but the new prices fail to produce the indirect
effects expected. The reason is the failure of the price effect to stimulate
the particular response in the private sector that is desired. Finally,
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to that intended. This paradoxical outcome seems more of a theoretical
curiosity than a real world problem and will not be considered further here.
(i) Offsetting Supply and Demand Responses.
There are a variety of both legal and illegal ways in which trade
policies can be rendered less effective than expected due to offsetting supply
and demand responses. Legal means include: (1) importing or exporting the
product in either more or less processed forms that are not covered by the
trade measure; (2) changing the quality mix of a traded product; (3) shifting
to a substitute product; (4) varying the country or domestic—customer distri-
bution of imports or exports; (5) shifting the country distribution of
production; and (6) retaliating with another trade policy measure. Furthermore,
trade policies can have offsetting macro effects. Illegal ways of avoiding
the restraining or promoting effects of a trade measure include:(1)
smuggling; (2) transshipments through third countries; (3) incorrect
invoicing; and (4) bribing customs officials. Several actual examples of
these various legal and illegal responses are given below. They come from
U.S. experiences but can easily be duplicated in other countries.
Avoiding an import restriction by exporting the product in less processed26
form is illustrated by the experience with shipments of small trucks to the
United States. The U.S. tariff rate on assembled trucks had been raised
earlier, but the rate on unassembled trucks was left at 4 per cent. The dif-
ference between the duty—inclusive prices of assembled and unassembled small
trucks exceeded the cost of assembling "knocked—down" trucks in the United
States. Therefore, small trucks were shipped unassembled, and integrated
domestic producers of trucks did not receive the degree of protection intended
from the tariff on fully assembled trucks.
This technique of avoiding high import duties is frequently followed in
the apparel trade. One case involves costs with removable sleeves. By
importing sleeves unattached, the rest of the coat comes in as a vest at a
lower duty than if the sleeves were attached.
Using substitute components is another common way of avoiding import
restrictions. The quotas on imports of sugar into the United States apply
only to pure sugar, defined as a 100 per cent sucrose. Importers are avoiding
the quotas by importing sugar products consisting mainly of sucrose but con-
taining some sugar substitute, e.g., dextrose. Importers of running shoes
also get around the high tariff on rubber footwear by using leather for most
of the upper portion of the shoes, thereby qualifying for duty treatment as
leather footwear.
The response of Japanese automobile suppliers to their government's
agreement to limit voluntarily exports of autos to the United States
illustrates how the restrictiveness of quotas can be offset in part by a shift
in the quality mix of a product. The introduction of a quantitative restric-
tion in contrast to an ad valorem tariff will in most circumstances lead to a
shift in the composition of the protected product from less expensive to more
expensive varieties. Such was the result in the auto case (as it had been27
earlier when quotas on textile products and on shoes were put into effect).
Thus, though the quantity of automobiles imported was reduced, the value of
these imports (after correcting for general inflation) increased significantly
as Japanese exporters responded to the excess demand for their cars by
shifting to their higher quality models. Since the value of imports fell less
than expected, employment in the U.S. auto industry increased correspondingly
less.
The auto case also illustrates the manner in which shifts in supply sources
can offset some of the intended effects of protection. It has been estimated
that European suppliers took up one—third of the "slack" created by the quotas
on Japanese cars. Furthermore, while the increased production of Japanese cars
within the United States ——butoutside of the Detroit area ——helped overall
U.S. employment, it hurt employment in the region suffering most from the auto
slump, namely, Detroit. The shift in production facilities to Singapore in
response to voluntary export restraints by Japanese for TV sets is another
example of this response.
Illegal actions designed to avoid the effects of protection are not a
major problem in most industrial countries but do significantly affect effec-
tive rates of protection in many developing countries where customs officials
are not as well trained and equipped and official levels of protection are
very high.
(ii) Uncertain Indirect Effects
As previously noted, a trade policy may not accomplish the desired objective
even when it produces the expected effects on domestic prices and trade. This
is because trade policies are often used to change economic variables that are
only indirectly related to the prices and quantities of traded goods. For28
example, an industry faced with a surge of injurious imports frequently seeks
temporary protection, arguing that protection will give the industry the time
and resources needed to introduce new and more productive equipment and tech-
niques. The modernization will supposedly eliminate the need for protection
after a few years.
Standard economic analysis does not suggest this outcome. If an industry
can be profitable with new equipment once protection is removed, why can't the
industry enter the capital market to obtain the necessary funds to purchase the
equipment? The answer often given is that an improved short—term profit perfor-
mance is necessary both as a source of of capital funds and as an encouragement
to other investors. However, a rational investor may attribute the better
short—run profit performance to the higher import protection and thus base his
judgment about long—term investment upon profit prospects in the absence of pro-
tection or else on the likelihood that protection will continue. Furthermore,
profits generated by protection may be used by the industry to invest In com-
pletely different activities. Workers in the U.S. steel industry have expressed
concern that the industry is using its profits ——partof which are attributable
to the import protection secured with the help of the workers ——toinvest in
other industries. Protected producers may also find that, from their
viewpoint, the best way for them to use the extra profits is to lobby for con-
tinued protection. This may provide employment for some individuals outside
of the injured industry but it does not add to the economy's real income.
Similar problems arise when the aim is to help selected groups in an
industry or to overcome particular domestic distortions. For example, raising
farm prices by means of trade measures in order to encourage family farming
may, in fact, increase the relative importance of corporate farming, since29
corporate farms are likely to have easier access to capital markets and there—
f ore be able to exploit new profit opportunities more rapidly. Similarly,
temporary protection is sometimes justified as a means of overcoming domestic
externalities associated with the acquisition of knowledge and on—the—job
training. But, in fact, the protection may lead merely to expansion using
existing productive techniques and skill mixes. Protection is such a crude
and blunt policy tool that It cannot be counted upon to produce many of the
Indirect effects it is called upon to do.
(iii) Conclusions on the Effectiveness of Trade Policy
In many instances the supply or demand responses making a trade policy inef-
fective are eventually blocked or a new policy instrument is selected to stimu-
late some indirect effect. However, often the delay In providing the intended
assistance to a sector is so long that much of the unemployment and losses the
protection is designed to prevent has already occurred.
The motivations of both industry representatives seeking protection and
government officials help to account for this result. Firms injured by imports
usually seek to define the industry as narrowly as possible. In this way they
have a better chance of proving serious injury. They also like to focus atten-
tion on just the exporters who are currently causing the import problem, since
this prevents opposition from developing on the part of other exporters.
Government officials also like this approach, since it avoids political
pressures from other countries supplying the same or similar products. However,
what may be gained in securing protection more quickly tends to be lost by its
ineffectiveness. Furthermore, while government officials may realize that some
simple supply response will undermine a particular protective action, the law30
may not permit the new product or source from also being restricted until the
supply shift actually occurs.
The policy conclusion to be drawn is simply that government officials and
others should become more realistic about what trade measures can accomplish.
Generally they are not the panacea for an industry's trade problems that
discussions about the proposed measures would lead one to believe, and they
often produce unfavorable side effects. Furthermore, it can be shown that
those trade policies that are growing most rapidly in popularity, namely,
discriminatory measures such as orderly marketing agreements, voluntary export
restraints, and selective embargoes, are the very ones likely to be least
effective.
VI. FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
As Richard Cooper once pointed out in the title of one of his papers, "Trade
Policy is Foreign Policy."13 Not to appreciate this is to fail to understand
some of the key trade policy decisions of national political leaders who bear
the main foreign policy and national security responsibilities for their
nations. These leaders realize that economic relations can significantly
affect political relations, and they take this into account in making their
decisions. It may, for example, be possible through government trade inter-
ventions to gain economically at the expense of another country. However,
this other country may react by taking such actions as discriminating against
investors of the country gaining this advantage, failing to support the
country in various international political forums, or rejecting cooperative
security arrangements. Political leaders must rightfully take into account
such interrelationships between trade policy and the many other elements that
affect foreign policy.31
They are especially concerned about preventing economic confrontations that
may escalate to the point where they endanger not only basic trade and invest-
ment relations but political relations as well. Consequently, these leaders
sometimes justify certain economic actions on economic grounds when they really
are taking into account both economic and political factors. Trade economists
have also not always been careful in distinguishing between the economic and
political arguments for particular trade policies. It is partly for this reason
that many business and labor leaders believe that modern economists conclude
that free trade is always the policy that maximizes a country's economic
welfare.
VII. TRADE POLICY OPTIONS IN A WORLD OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE
As noted at the beginning of the paper, trade measures can usefully be divi—
ded Into those that are introduced in reaction to disruptive external shocks and
those put into effect in anticipation of dynamic international changes. The
purpose of the reactive measures is to mitigate the adverse employment and
income consequences of the external shocks. In contrast, the aim of an activist
trade policy approach is to anticipate dynamic international changes and thereby
minimize their negative and maximize their positive income and employment
effects. A third option can be termed the cooperative international approach.
Whereas the activist and reactive approaches can be pursued independently by any
country, the cooperative approach requires consensus among countries concerning
what constitutes "good" International trade policy behavior as well as how to
resolve any disputes that arise in interpreting "good" behavior. This last sec-
tion of the paper considers various policy options within these three
approaches. It should be emphasized that these three options are not mutually
exclusive; all can be followed at the same time.32
(i) Reactive Trade Policy Options
There are essentially three different types of policies for offsetting the
injurious effects of structural changes emanating from the international trading
sector, namely, import restrictions, subsidization, and adjustment assistance.
Not only must governments decide upon the proper mix of these policies but there
are numerous decisions to be made concerning the particular form each of the
different policies will take. For example, if import restrictions are used,
should they take the form of tariffs or quantitative restrictions? Should the
restrictions be directed at the country or countries from which the disruptive
imports are coming or should all exporting countries bear part of the burden of
the cutback? Still other issues to be decided are whether the restrictions
should be temporary or permanent and selective or general.
Since subsidization can take many forms, there are also numerous matters to
be settled if this policy is followed. For example, should the subsidies be
directed only on that portion of an industry's output that is exported or at all
production? What form should the subsidization take? ——subsidizationof sales?
investment subsidies? wage subsidies? Government assistance directed at helping
workers and firms to adjust to new activities raises similar questions. How
much aid should go to workers and how much to capitalists? How should the aid
to workers be divided among unemployment payments, retraining benefits,
job—search payments, migration assistance, etc2
Two other matters that have been raised in recent discussions and that
affect all three policies are, first, whether aid to an industry should be con-
tingent upon the industry agreeing upon and carrying Out a specific economic
plan for adaptation to the changed international circumstances, and second,33
whether the tariff revenue (or its equivalent) generated by protection should be
earmarked for assistance to the injured industry.
(a) Import Restrictions
Article 19 of the GATT specifically permits countries to introduce import
restrictions if a product is being imported in such increased quantities as to
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers, and this provi-
sion has been utilized many times. However, studies of industries which have
received protection generally indicate rather disappointing results. Rather
than returning to prosperous conditions after a short term of protection, most
assisted sectors have continued to decline in employment terms with even the
reduced work force being faced with periodic episodes of unemployment. The
reason is that ——unlikethe drafters of Article 19 seemed to think ——injurious
increases in imports usually have been manifestations of long—run structural
changes and not temporary economic shifts. Consequently, domestic producers
have been confronted with a continuous lowering of foreign costs relative to
'their own. Tariffs sufficient to offset the desired fraction of today's rela-
tive cost advantage for foreign producers are insufficient to deal with their
cost advantage tomorrow. Quantitative restrictions have been tried to over-
come this problem but the resulting shifts in the composition of exports have
significantly undermined the effectiveness of this means of import control.
Workers in the injured industries have obviously been helped in the short
run by import restrictions but some of the longer—run effects have been unfavor-
able. Management in the affected industries usually concludes that the only
chance of remaining competitive is by introducing more modern equipment, much of
which is highly labor—saving. Thus, more and more workers are displaced, not
by imports, but by labor—saving equipment introduced in response to the34
increased imports. Retaliatory actions by other countries also reduced
employment in other sectors.
One way in which countries have tried to minimize retaliatory action is by
restricting imports only from those countries from which most of the increased
imports have come. Voluntary export restraints and orderly marketing agreements
have been used for this purpose. As previously noted, however, shifts in supply
to Third World countries can undermine these arrangements. They are also incon-
sistent with existing GATT rules. The developing countries still strongly
oppose any changes in GATT safeguard procedures that would permit "selectivity,"
i.e., discriminatory treatment of imports from different sources.
Extending protection to more and more sectors faced with structural adjust-
ment problems also begins to create macro difficulties in increasing employment.
As noted earlier, the reduction in the real purchasing power of a given money
wage due to the price increase in imports and domestic substitutes causes
workers to demand (and receive) higher money wages. This, in turn, tends to
decrease employment in the export sector as foreigners shift to suppliers in
other countries. Even if imports decline more than exports, the net beneficial
employment effect will tend to be offset by a currency appreciation under the
existing flexible exchange—rate system.
In short, experience and economic analysis seem to suggest that, while pro-
tection can play an important short—run role in mitigating the employment
effects of increased imports, it is not an effective long—run answer to struc-
tural employment problems emanating from the international sector.
(b) Subsidies
Subsidization has the appeal of being a more selective method of providing
assistance to structurally depressed sectors than tariffs. The aid can be35
directed at particular firms, at only the output exported or at particular
factors of productior, such as labor. Furthermore, the assistance is more
closely tied to economic performance.
Wage subsidies are an especially effective means of maximizing the
employment impact of industrial assistance. Moreover, in some cases they can be
justified on economic efficiency grounds because they offset an economic distor-
tion. For example, in certain industries characterized by imperfect product and
factor markets, wages have risen to levels considerably above the national
average for workers with comparable skills. This has the effect of keeping
employment in these industries below what it would be under a more competitive
market structure. If it is impossible to change the market structure directly,
the distortion can be offset by a wage subsidy. Depending upon the feasible
alternatives for dealing with the output—reducing effects of the imperfection in
product markets, a production subsidy may also be appropriate, assuming that
other countries do not retaliate.
A problem with wage and production subsidies, however, is that they do not
directly stimulate the increased efficiency needed before the industry can com-
pete successfully without government assistance. Investment subsidies are more
appropriate for this objective.
GATT rules permit other countries to impose countervailing duties in
response to domestic subsidies (most export subsidies are banned outright), pro-
vided they cause material injury. Moreover, as the use of subsidies increases,
there is a tendency for countries to enforce their countervailing duty laws more
vigorously. Thus, even when subsidies can be justified on economic grounds,
they ay prove ineffective because of retaliatory actions.
Another argument sometimes put forth in comparing subsidies and tariffs is36
that the existence of budgetary costs in the case of subsidies introduces
political pressures tending to prevent the subsidies from becoming permanent.
However, actual experience with subsidies does not seem to indicate that sub-
sidies are likely to be kept in place for shorter periods than tariffs. As in
the tariff case, those who benefit from subsidies tend to organize readily into
political pressure groups, whereas those who pay for the subsidies do not come
together into an effective countervailing pressure group. The pressures from
foreign governments during multilateral trade negotiations to reduce tariffs
sometimes seem more effective than the domestic interests who bear the budge-
tary costs of subsidies.
(c) Adjustment Assistance
Adjustment assistance programs are designed mainly to help displaced workers
move to new jobs and injured firms develop new product lines. In other words,
rather than being based on the assumption that assistance to the industry in the
form of import protection or subsidies will enable the industry to regain its
ability to compete internationally, the adjustment assistance approach accepts
the premise that the industry must decline to some extent and tries to facili-
tate the shift of labor and capital to new productive employment.
The joint paper submitted by the American and Canadian governments reviews
existing trade adjustment assistance programs in detail. The record on their
effectiveness is a mixed one. They have clearly provided much needed income
support for displaced workers while they were looking for alternative
employment. Furthermore, the programs have probably served in some cases to
prevent extreme forms of import protection. However, there is also evidence
suggesting that workers delay taking new jobs because of the income payments.
Moreover, the results from the retraining and relocation components of the37
programs have been disappointing.
Various forms of wage subsidization to encourage employers in other sectors
to hire the displaced workers have been suggested as a means of avoiding the
problem of income payments acting to prolong unemployment. For example, one
proposal involves issuing vouchers to displaced workers who then search for
suitable education or training and use the vouchers to pay for the costs of
training at various schools or employer on—the—job training.
(d) Offsetting Foreign Subsidies and Dumping
One type of injurious shock that receives special reactive treatment is the
"unfair" disruptions caused by government subsidization and certain private
practices, such as dumping. Countries are permitted under GATT rules to impose
special duties equal to the degree of subsidization and the dumping margin in
order to offset the injurious effects of these practices. As the extent and
forms of subsidization have increased significantly among the industrial
countries, the governments of those nations that have not subsidized their
industries as much as most have begun to react more vigorously to the sub-
sidizing activities of others. Some officials and private sector leaders, in
these countries argue that the major cause of the severity of their adjustment
problems is not shifts in comparative costs brought about by changes in basic
resource and demand conditions, but subsidization by other governments that
artificially creates sudden changes in comparative advantage.
(e) Conclusions
There is no single reactive trade policy option that meets all of a
government's goals in trying to mitigate the adverse effects of structural
changes coming from the international trading sector. Most governments seem to38
think that a mixture of the different options is optimal.
One recent suggestion for helping to decide upon the proper mix is to
require that major industries receiving assistance in one form or another
should, as a condition for receiving the assistance, develop fairly detailed
economic plans for correcting their unfavorable economic condition. If, for
example, the industry contends that temporary protection will- enable firms to
meet competition through modernization, they would be required to support their
belief by tentative commitments from investors or economic projections appraised
by neutral industry experts. To the extent that some shifting of labor and
capital to different sectors appears necessary, the plans would provide details
on plant closing and layoffs over time. The planning process would also
involve setting forth alternative scenarios depending upon the extent and length
of government assistance.
Many governments already undertake this type of planning as part of their
assistance programs to industries. There are also some examples of cooperative
planning among nations. Those who are skeptical about this approach point to
the poor record of planners in trying to predict market developments and argue
that the planning process is likely to become highly politicized. They also
note that foreign producers may take advantage of the greater certainty in the
country's behavior to capture an even larger share of world markets.
Another recent proposal aimed at reducing the resistance to using government
funds for assistance purposes is to finance the costs from the tariff revenues
generated by a temporary increase in protection.14 This arrangement has appeal
on equity grounds, since domestic consumers who benefit from the cheaper imports
would be asked to give up a part of these benefits to finance the costs of
adjusting to these imports. Under the current practice of restricting imports39
quantitatively by means of voluntary export restraints (VERs) or orderly
marketing agreements (OMAs), domestic consumers already give up these benefits
because the foreign supply price increases by the tariff—equivalent rate.
Consequently, domestic consumers are indifferent between tariffs (or an arrange-
ment whereby the quota rights are given to importers or auctioned off by the
government) and VERs or OMAs. However, in the tariff case the government
obtains revenue with which to finance adjustment assistance.
It is, of course, foreign suppliers who fare better under the VERs than
under tariffs, since they reap a windfall gain equivalent to the tariff revenue.
However, foreign suppliers also may benefit in the long run with the tariff,
since when the tariff revenue is used to finance adjustment, the adjustment pro-
cess Is likely to take place more rapidly and the level of protection may be
lowered sooner. However, this latter outcome may not occur. By earmarking
tariff revenues for adjustment assistance rather than relying on general reve-
nues for this purpose, it may be more difficult to phase out the tariffs because
of the organized resistance of the firms and workers who receive the assistance.
(ii) An Activist Trade Policy Approach
As a result of the generally disappointing experience with reactive trade
policies, there are an increasing number of calls for an activist approach to
trade policy. A country should not ——Itis argued ——passivelywait until it
is confronted with a structural unemployment problem caused by international
shocks but, instead, anticipate and take advantage of dynamic changes in the
structure of trade. Such an approach supposedly would ease the problems of
short—run adjustment both by facilitating the gradual shift of workers out of
structurally weak sectors before they are displaced in large numbers and by40
opening up new employment opportunities for these workers. Those who favor a
vigorous industrial policy on the part of the government as well as aggressive
strategic government behavior in trade matters are usually associated with this
activist approach.
(a) Industrial Policy
There are some government economic interventions aimed at stimulating long—
run income and employment growth in every OECD country. Countries relying
primarily on the private market mechanism to allocate resources over time tend
to restrict their interventions to such measures as accelerated depreciation
allowances, subsidies for pure reseaich and higher education, infrastructure
subsidies, and active anti—trust enforcement. However, other countries are also
prepared to target particular industries and geographic areas for growth and to
provide these sectors with investment subsidies, assistance for applied research
and specific labor training allowances. Some governments futher believe that
public ownership of certain industries is necessary both to take full advantage
of expansionary opportunities and to carry Out long—run adjustment policy
effectively.
Because of the dismal structural unemployment outlook in many OECD countries
and the fact that in principle most forms of intervention can be justified as
means of offsetting various economic distortions and market imperfections, there
are strong domestic pressures in these countries for extending government
interventions. Options with important trade implications include greatly
increased government subsidies for applied research, training, investment, and
information activities in industries where export opportunities are expanding
more rapidly. Similar assistance is also urged by some for declining import—41
competing sectors in order to revitalize them. Alternatively, the government
might use its authority to force a faster pace of adjustment in these latter
sectors than will occur under imperfect market conditions. Generous early
retirement allowances and buy—out payments for unprofitable firms, tax
allowance penalties for hiring young mobile workers, and expanded retraining
and resettlement allowances would be the type of policies utilized to facili-
tate resource shifts out of declining sectors.
A key element In the actIvIst approach Is better coordInatIon, not only
between different government programs and policies, but among government, labor,
and business. This could involve reorganizing government agencies dealing with
industry, labor, and trade so that they work together more effectively and pro-
vide clearer signals to labor and business on the intent of government policy.
However, It could also entail detailed government planning with respect to the
future Industrial structure of the economy and explicit agreements with labor
concerning wages, job security, retraining, etc., and with business concerning
investment, product, and profit levels. Obviously, there are also manypossible
intermediate levels of coordination.
Industrial policy has a mixed record of accomplishment. In France during
the early postwar period, as well as in Japan, well—defined industrial policy
appears to have played an important role in stimulating employment and growth.
In contrast, there also seem to be numerous examples where this approach has
served to slow down adjustment and growth. Unfortunately, we do not as yet
understand why the outcome varies so much among countries and over time and
whether success in one country can be replicated in another.42
(b) Strategic Behavior
Another form of an activist trade policy approach that is receiving
increasing attention is strategic behavior aimed at increasing a country's
market share (and thus employment level) or terms of trade at the expense of
other trading nations. Since international competition among private producers
tn many industrial markets is highly imperfect, some argue that a country's
government should use its subsidy and tax powers to help shift part of the
excess profits existing in such markets toward its own citizens, because other
governments will try to do the same regardless of what their own government
does. This type of behavior is also justified, especially in third markets, on
the grounds that the market position of their competitors is often based on
"unfair" government subsidies of one form or another. Still another justifica-
tion expressed for this type of behavior is that it will force one's competitors
to conform more closely to existing international rules of good behavior, or
induce them to negotiate new ones when current rules are inadequate.
(iii) International Cooperation
There are valid national reasons why countries may wish to introduce
industrial policies or to behave strategically in competing for international
markets. However, in the absence of well—defined international rules con-
cerning just what constitutes acceptable international behavior under these
policies and setting forth workable dispute settlement mechanisms, there are
also dangers with an activist trade policy approach. When each country
aggressively pursues this approach and retaliates against others who do so, it
is possible that all trading nations end with lower employment and income
levels than otherwise as the sequence of actions results in a negative sum43
game. Furthermore, when some countries do end up better off, objections can
be raised on international equity grounds, since these countries tend to be the
ones that are already the economically most powerful and their gain is usually
at the expense of the poorest nations.
One response to these dangers is to seek to enhance international coopera-
tion in areas where nationally—oriented active and reactive trade policies can
bring about an outcome in which all countries lose, or else in which only those
countries that are already comparatively well—off gain. The goal would be to
achieve the advantages from an activist approach in helping to solve the
structural income and employment problems of OECD countries without jeopar-
dizing the great economic benefits of interdependence. This is, of course, the
approach being followed in GATT, OECD, UNCTAD, and other international organi-
zations dealing with trade issues.
The cooperative international approach worked quite well for many years
after World War II. However, fundamental changes in the distribution of econo-
mic power among countries, coupled with differences among countries in the extent
to which they have aggressively pursued active and reactive trade policies, have
served to lessen the effectiveness of the rules under which the postwar trading
regime has operated. As previously noted, some governments have actively
assisted the private sector in trying to develop new product lines, as well as
to ease the adjustment problems in older product lines. They maintain that
this development assistance has been necessary to offset the size and initial
technological advantages of certain other countries. However, as these latter
countries have been faced both with appreciable reductions in their shares of
world product markets and significant foreign penetration of their own markets,
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government intervention by the first group of countries. There is, for example,
a definite policy shift toward a more vigorous enforcement of countervailing
duty, antidumping and other so—called 'unfair trade" laws by these countries.
Furthermore, they are increasing pressures for their governments also to adopt a
more extensive set of activist trade policies.
The present international situation is thus one of disequilibrium in terms
of trade policy behavior. Those countries that have been intervening most
extensively in the trade field are not prepared to change their policies,
whereas those in which the intervention has been the least are now beginning
to intervene more themselves. The possibility for a sequence of trade policy
actions and reactions in which income and employment end up at lower levels is
thus a very real one. Perhaps, as some argue, such a scenario is necessary to
bring the governments involved to the negotiating table to hammer out a set of
international rules that better fit the realities of the new distribution of
international economic power. Countries may have to test their power in
today's imperfect markets before they are prepared to agree upon cooperative
solutions to today's world trading problems.
Any successful cooperative approach that emerges is likely to require
agreements on several key elements of trade policy. One of the most important
of these concerns the types of government intervention, especially public sub-
sidization, that should and should not be countered with offsetting actions by
other governments. Present GATT rules and practices are not sufficiently pre-
cise in this area. National laws on countervailing are also too simplistic to
deal with modern conditions. In particular, there is insufficient recognition
of the role for activist trade policies. By no means are all such policies
aimed at gaining at the expense of others. Some can bring gains to all trading45
parties. Yet these are not sufficiently delineated in either GATT or national
rules nor are the procedures for settling disputes in this area sufficiently
effective.
Greater agreement among the industrial countries concerning temporary
assistance to sectors faced with severe adjustment problems is also needed.
Countries claiming that their subsidies are strictly for adjustment purposes
sometimes find their adjustment problems made worse by countervailing duties
imposed by others. The need for a new safeguards code has also been recognized
for several years.
Multilateral agreements relating to competition policy seem necessary. When
international markets are imperfect, the abnormal profits that are available are
tempting targets of government trade policies. However, if international
understandings can be developed that discourage cartel—like behavior, abuse of
dominant market positions, and attempts to monopolize, much of the incentive for
such aggressive trade policies will be eliminated. It is unlikely that com-
petition policy can be dealt with adequately without also strengthening existing
agreements relating to foreign direct investment. Greater international
cooperation is also needed in the areas of exchange rate, monetary, and fiscal
policies. Many countries claim that independent actions by some nations in
these policy areas create serious income and employment problems that affect
both their trading and non—trade sectors. They argue that without cooperative
efforts to mitigate these problems, agreements in such areas as subsidization
will not be meaningful or effective.46
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